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SOME APPLICATIONS OF ARITHMETIC GROUPS IN
CRYPTOGRAPHY
DELARAM KAHROBAEI AND KEIVAN MALLAHI-KARAI
Abstract. In this paper we will offer a new symmetric-key cryptographic scheme
which is based on the existence of exponentially distorted subgroups in arithmetic
groups. Aside from this, we will also provide new examples of distorted subgroups
in SLn(Z[x]) which can be utilized for the same purpose.
1. Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld, group theory has proved to be
a rich source of platforms for cryptographic primitives. While the initial constructions
were based on abelian groups (e.g. additive and multiplicative group of finite fields),
more recently various non-abelian groups have also emerged as effective tools for such
constructions.
Various concrete groups have been proposed as platforms for various encryption
methods. For instance, braid groups constructed by Emil Artin [2] are examples of
such groups based on which Anshel, Anshel and Goldfeld [1], and, independently, Ko,
Lee, Cheon, Han, Kang and Park [8] constructed two cryptosystems. Note that in
these constructions the difficulty of decryption relies on difficulty of solving a specific
problem in the undellying group. For instance, in the case of braid groups, it is
the conjugacy search problem that will make the platform useful for cryptography.
Linear groups were proposed by Baumslag-Fine-Xu [3], this proposal is also proposes
a symmetric-key encryption using matrices.
In this paper we focus on symmetric-key cryptographic scheme in section 2.2, which
use the idea of decoy. This idea has been discussed in series of series of paper by
Cavallo, Di Crecsenzo, Kahrobaei, Khodjaeva, Shpilrain [6, 7] on secure delegation of
computation where decoys are used in a different context. In our context, the idea
appears to be new and, moreover, yields some interesting questions in group theory.
In this paper, we will turn to class of groups, namely, arithmetic groups, that have
not yet attracted as much attention in group-based cryptography. Roughly speaking,
to construct an arithmetic group, one starts with a linear algebraic group defined over
the field of rational numbers, and considers the elements of the group with integer
entries. Recall that a linear algebraic group G is a subgroup of the group of n × n
invertible matrices that is defined by the zero set of a finite number of polynomials.
When these polynomials have rational coefficients, we say that G is defined over the
field of rational numbers.
1
Let us explain this by an example: consider the special linear group SLn defined by
the condition det(X) = 1. Then the associated arithmetic group is the group SLn(Z)
consisting of n × n matrices with integer entries. Arithmetic groups have been the
subject of many studies. For a basic introduction to arithmetic groups, we refer the
reader to [4]. The aspect of arithmetic groups that will be useful for us is the existence
of U-elements in them. Roughly speaking, an element g of a finitely generated group
G is called a U-element if for all n ≥ 1 the element gn can be expressed as a word
of length C log(|n| + 1) in terms of generators of the group. Arithmetic groups tend
to have an abundance of unipotent elements. In fact, it’s a celebrated theorem of
Lubotzky, Mozes, Raghunathan [9] that under some (necessary) conditions on the
arithmetic group G, U-elements in G are precisely the virtually unipotent elements.
In this direction, we will prove the following theorem, which, among other things,
will show provide a large number of “arithmetic-like” groups also have a wealth of
U-elements, and hence can be used for our cryptographic platform. More precisely,
we will show
Theorem 1.1. Let n ≥ 3, and m ≥ 1. An element of the group SLn(Z[x1, . . . , xm])
is a U-element iff it is virtually unipotent.
For the definition of U-elements, its history and relevant results, as well as the
proof of Theorem 1.1, we will refer the reader to section 4.
Our goal in this paper is to show how one can exploit properties of these groups
to construct new cryptosystems. We propose a new platform for the private key
encryption schemes developed by Chatterji, Kahrobaei, Lu. They use the fact that
there are exponentially distorted subgroups in certain groups that the geodesic length
problem is in polynomial time. In particular they propose certain classes of hyperbolic
group. In this paper we propose that using distortion of the unipotent subgroups in
lattices in higher rank Lie groups similar platforms can be constructed.
2. The Cryptosystems Using Subgroup Distortion
The following cryptosystems have been proposed in [5] who suggested using Gromov
hyperbolic groups. Here we put forward new classes of discrete group for this purpose.
2.1. The protocol I: basic idea. Assume that Alice and Bob would like to commu-
nicate over an insecure channel. Let G = 〈g1, · · · , gl|R〉 be a public group such that
solving the geodesic length problem in G is possible in polynomial time. Assume that
G has a large number of distorted subgroups. Let H = 〈t1, · · · , ts〉 ⊂ 〈g1, · · · , gl〉 = G
be a secret subgroup of G, that is distorted and shared only between Alice and Bob.
(1) Suppose that the secret message is a integer n ≥ 1. Alice picks h ∈ H with
ℓH(h) = n, expresses h in terms of generators of G with ℓG(h) = m≪ n and
sends h to Bob.
(2) Bob then converts h back in terms of generators ofH and computes ℓH(g) = m
in polynomial time according to assumption to recover n.
2.1.1. Security. Although H is not known to anyone except to Alice and Bob and h
being sent with length m ≪ n gives infinitely many possible guesses for the eaves-
dropper Eve, the security of the scheme is weak since Eve will eventually intercept
sufficiently many elements of H to generate H (one can think of the group Z of in-
tegers, it is enough to intercept two relatively prime integers to generate the whole
group).
2.2. The protocol I: secure version. In order to make it difficult for Eve to identify
the subgroup H , suppose that Alice also sends along with h occasionally elements of
G that do not belong to H . To determine how Bob can tell which elements belong to
H to retrieve the correct message, we will consider below the subgroup membership
problem and the random number generator.
2.2.1. Subgroup membership problem. Suppose we have a group in which the subgroup
membership problem can be solved efficiently. Then we will send some random words
and the receiver first checks whether each word belongs to H and then computes its
length.
Protocol: Let G = 〈g1, · · · , gl|RG〉 be a group that is known to the public such that
solving the geodesic length problem is possible in polynomial time and that G has an
abundance of distorted subgroups. Let H = 〈h1, · · · , hs〉 be a shared secret subgroup
of G that is exponentially distorted. Assume that the subgroup membership problem
in G efficiently solvable.
(1) Alice picks h ∈ H with ℓH(h) = n, expresses h = g1 · · · gm in terms of genera-
tors of G with ℓG(h) = m ≪ n. She randomly generates a0, . . . , am ∈ G \H
and sends these words to Bob.
(2) Since Bob knows the generating set for H , he finds h ∈ H (since he could
check the subgroup membership problem efficiently) he only uses h ∈ H , and
expressed it in terms of generators ofH and computes ℓH(g) = n in polynomial
time using the assumption for G to recover n.
3. U-elements in lattices in higher rank Lie groups
In this section, we will review some of the basic properties of those matrix groups
that were used in Section 2 for constructing the cryptosystems. As indicated there,
the construction is based on existence of pairs (G,H), consisting of a finitely generated
group G, and a subgroup H of G with the following properties:
(1) There exists a constant C1 > 0 such that for every h ∈ H , one can compute
in a polynomial time a path from the identity to h whose length is bounded
from above by C1ℓG(h).
(2) The membership problem in H can be solved in polynomial time.
(3) H is exponentially distorted in G, that is, there exists a constant C2 > 0 such
that for all h ∈ H we have
ℓG(h) ≤ C2 log(1 + ℓH(h)).
(4) H has many conjugates in G. More precisely, the index of the normalizer
NG(H) in G is infinite.
Before we proceed, let us review some definitions. Let G be a finitely generated
group with a fixed generating set S. For every g ∈ G, denote by ℓG,S(g), or simply
ℓG(g) when S is implicitly fixed, the least integer k ≥ 0 such that g can be expressed
as a product g = ge11 . . . g
ek
k , where gi ∈ S and ei = ±1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The
number ℓ(g) is called the length of element g with respect to the generating set S.
One can easily show that if S1 and S2 are two finite generating sets for G, then
ℓG,S1(g) ≤ CℓG,S2(g) for some constant C > 0 and all g ∈ G. This simple fact shows
that the choice of S is immaterial for our discussion.
We will now discuss some examples of groups that will appear in our construction.
Let us start with the most prominent example, namely, the special linear group
SLn(Z), which consists of all matrices of determinant 1 with entries in Z. A subgroup
H of SLn(Z) is called unipotent if it consists of unipotent matrices, that if for every
u ∈ H all the eigenvalues of u are equal to 1.
Let Hn denote the subgroup of SLn(Z) consisting of all upper-triangular matrices
with 1 on the diagonal with all the off-diagonal entries which are not on the first row
are equal to zero. A typical element of Hn has the following form:
h =


1 0 0 . . . h1n
0 1 0 . . . h2n
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 1 hn−1,n
0 0 0 0 1


Note thatHn is an abelian algebraic subgroup of SLn(Z) defined by linear equations
xii − 1 = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, xij = 0, 2 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n.
A simple corollary of this fact is that that the membership problem for an element
h ∈ SLn(Z) in Hn can be solved in polynomial time in size of entries of h. Let
g ∈ SLn(Z) be an arbitrary element, and consider the conjugate subgroup g−1Hng.
Note that that g−1Hng is also an algebraic group, and its defining equations can be
obtained by transforming the set of equations given above for H using conjugation
with g. In particular, the membership problem for all conjugates of Hn can also be
solved in polynomial time.
3.1. Distortion. Suppose H is a finitely generated subgroup of a finitely generated
group G. Let SH and SG denote two fixed generating sets for H and G respectively.
Recall that H is exponentially distorted in G if there exists a constant C > 0 such
that for each element h ∈ H , we have
ℓG(h) ≤ C log(1 + ℓH(h)).
In other words, the geodesic joining the identity element to k in G is shorter by an
exponentially large factor than the one in H itself. An element u ∈ G is called a
U-element if the cyclic subgroup H = 〈u〉 is infinite and exponentially distorted in
G. In other words, g is a U-element if
ℓG(g
n) ≤ C log(1 + |n|)
holds for all n ≥ 1, and some C > 0. It is easy to see that the definition of U -elements
does not depend on the choice of the generating set S. Let us recall some examples
of exponential distortion.
Example 3.1. Let G denote the Baumslag-Solitar group B(1, 2), generated by ele-
ments t and a subject to the single relation t−1at = a2. Denote by S the generating
set consisting of a±1 and t±1, and by K the infinite cyclic group generated by a. It is
easy to see that ℓK(a
n) grows linearly with n. On the other hand, since t−katk = a2
k
,
we have ℓG(a
2k) ≤ 2k + 1. By expressing an arbitrary integer n in base 2, one can
easily show that the bound ℓG(a
n) = O(logn) holds for all n ≥ 2.
This group can indeed be realised as a linear group. To see this, set
t =
(
2 0
0 1
)
, a =
(
1 1
0 1
)
It is easy to see that the pair (t, a) satisfy the relation tat−1 = a2, and hence one can
write an as a word of length O(logn) in terms of a and t.
A celebrated theorem of Lubotzky, Mozes, and Raghunathan [9] classifies U-elements
for the class of S-arithmetic groups in higher rank. This class includes groups such
as SLn(Z) for n ≥ 3. As we will be mostly interested in applications, we will only
mention a special case of their result. For convenience of the reader we will also
provide a proof of a special case which also goes back to [9].
Theorem 3.1 (Lubotzky, Mozes, Raghunathan). For n ≥ 3, an element g ∈ SLn(Z)
is a U-element if and only if g is virtually unipotent, that is, there exists k ≥ 1 such
that gk is unipotent.
For a matrix A ∈ SLn−1(Z), and a vector v ∈ Zn−1, write
M(A, v) =
(
A v
0 1
)
A simple computation shows that
(1) M(A, 0)M(Id, v)M(A, 0)−1 = M(Id, Av).
where throughout the the article Id denotes the identity matrix of the appropriate
size.
Proposition 3.2. For every vector v ∈ Zn−1, the length of the element M(I, v) in
SLn(Z) is bounded by C log(1 + ‖v‖) for some constant C, which only depends on n.
Moreover, there exists a constant C1 such that a path of length C log(1 + ‖v‖) from
the identity element to g can be constructed in polynomial time in ‖v‖.
Proof. We will give a proof of the bound ℓS(M(I, v)) ≤ C log(1 + ‖v‖). It is a
direct corollary of the proof that a path connecting e to M(I, v) can also be found
in polynomial time in ‖v‖. It is easy to see that the statement will follow the special
case of n = 3. So, let us assume that n = 3 and consider a matrix M(I, v) for some
v ∈ Z2. Let e1, e2 denote the standard basis for Z2, and consider the matrix
A =
(
1 1
1 0
)
.
One can check that A has two real eigenvalues λ1 > 1 and −1 < λ2 < 0 given by
λ1 = α, λ2 = −α−1,
where α = 1+
√
5
2
and α−1 =
√
5−1
2
. Denote the corresponding eigenvectors by v1 and
v2. These are given by
v1 =
(
α
1
)
, v2 =
(−α−1
1
)
.
Note that v1 and v2 are linearly independent, and for each integer k ≥ 1 we have
Akv1 = λ
k
1v1, A
−kv2 = λ
−k
2 v2.
It will be desirable to work with vectors with integral coordinates. Hence, we set
w1 =
1√
5
(α−1v1 + αv2) =
(
0
1
)
, w2 =
1√
5
(v1 − v2) =
(
1
0
)
.
Since |λ1| > 1 and |λ2| < 1, we can easily see that for large values of k we have
‖Akw1‖ = ‖λk1v1 + λk2v2‖ ≈ λk1‖w1‖.
Similarly,
‖A−kw2‖ = ‖λ−k1 v1 + λ−k2 v2‖ ≈ λ−k2 ‖w2‖.
These, in particular, show that the vectors w1 and w2 expand exponentially under,
respectively, positive and negative powers of A. From here one can readily see that
every vector in Z2 is at a bounded distance from the set{ −1∑
k=−m
βkA
kw2 +
m∑
k=0
βkA
kw1 : βi ∈ {0, 1, 2}, m ≥ 1
}
.
and that m the value of m can be chosen to be of the order C log(1 + ‖v‖) for some
constant C. The claim will now follow immediately from (1).

Let H denote the abelian subgroup of SLn(Z) consisting of all matrices of the form
M(Id, v) with v ∈ Zn−1. In the next proposition we will show that NG(H) has infinite
index in G
Proposition 3.3. The normalizer of H consists of matrices of the form(
Bn−1×n−1 xn−1×1
01×n−1 ǫ
)
where B ∈ GLn(Z), ǫ = ±1 and detB = ǫ, and has infinite index in G.
Proof. Consider a matrix C in the normalizer of H in SLn(Z), and assume that it is
partitioned into blocks as
A =
(
B x
yt ǫ
)
where B is n− 1 by n− 1, x, y ∈ Zn, ǫ ∈ Z and t denotes the transpose. This implies
that for every vector a ∈ Zn, there exists a vector a′ ∈ Zn such that(
B x
yt ǫ
) (
Id a
0 1
)
=
(
Id a′
0 1
)(
B x
yt ǫ
)
.

Comparing the entries (n, n) of the products yields for every a ∈ Zn:
yta+ ǫ = ǫ
which implies that y = 0. From here it follows easily that ǫ detB = 1. Since detB ∈ Z
and ǫ detB = 1, we must have detB = ǫ ∈ {±1}. This proves the claim. It is now
obvious that this subgroup has infinite index in SLn(Z).
Proposition 3.4. Every conjugate of A is also exponentially distorted in SLn(Z).
Proof. Let SA denote a generating set for A, and for g ∈ G, set Sg = {gag−1 : a ∈ SA}.
Consider an element x ∈ Hg := g−1Ag, and write x = g−1ag for some a ∈ H . Since
H is exponentially distorted in SLn(Z), we have
ℓG(a) ≤ C log(1 + ℓH(a)).
This implies that
ℓG(x) ≤ C log(1 + ℓHg(x)).
where ℓHg is the word metric on H
g defined with respect to the generating set Sg.
This proves the claim. 
From here we can see that any one of the conjugates of H can be used instead of
H . The versatility gained in this way allows us to replace H by its conjugates, which
are all isomorphic to H , but are harder to detect.
4. Non-arithmetic linear groups with U-elements
In this section we will construct a new class of linear groups with a wealth of U-
elements that have the desired properties for the encryption scheme we have before.
Let Rm := Z[x1, . . . , xm] denote the ring of polynomials with integer coefficients
in variables x1, . . . , xm. Denote by SLn(Z[x1, . . . , xm]) the group consisting of n × n
matrices of determinant 1 with entries fromRm. Note that ifR is any Z-ring generated
by m elements, then R can be viewed as a quotient of Rm. Note that any ring
homomorphism φ : Rm → R induces a group homomorphism from SLn(Rm) into
SLn(R). It is important to remark that this homomorphism need not be surjective.
For simplicity of notation, we will prove Theorem 1.1 in the special case of m = 1. It
can be easily seen that the same proof works for general m ≥ 1. More precisely, we
will show
Theorem 4.1. For n ≥ 3, an element u of the group G = SLn(Z[x]) is a U-element
iff u is virtually unipotent.
Before starting the proof we will need a lemma about virtually unipotent matrices
in SLn(Z):
Lemma 4.2. Suppose n ≥ 2, and g ∈ SLn(Z) is a virtually unipotent matrix. Then
there exists r = r(n) only depending on n such that (gr − Id)n = 0.
Proof. Suppose g ∈ SLn(Z) is a virtually unipotent matrix. Since gm is unipotent for
some m ≥ 1, we know that every eigenvalue of g is a root of unity. On the other hand,
the characteristic polynomial of g has degree at most n, implying that any eigenvalue
λ of g is a root of polynomial equation of degree at most n with integer coefficient.
In view of the fact that that if degree of a k-th root of unity is φ(k), and the simple
fact that φ(k) → ∞ as k → ∞, it follows that only finitely many roots of unity can
be potentially eigenvalues of g. In particular, there exists an integer r ≥ 1 depending
only on n and not on g such that (gr − Id)n = 0. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let us first show that if u is a U-element then u is virtually
unipotent. For each integer k ∈ Z, let evk : Z[x] → Z denote the evaluation homomor-
phism at point k, mapping f(z) ∈ Z[x] to f(k). Denote by πk : SLn(Z[x]) → SLn(Z)
the group homomorphism which is induced by evk. Since u is a U-element, it follows
from Lemma 4.4 that πk(u) is also a U-element, and hence virtually unipotent. From
the above remark it follows that (φk(u)
r − Id)n = 0. This means that for each entry
of the matrix (ur − Id)n (which is a polynomial in x) when evaluated at an arbitrary
integer is zero. This implies that (ur − Id)n = 0, which shows that u is virtually
unipotent.
Let us now prove the converse statement. Let us denote the elementary matrix
with entry t in row i and column j by Eij(t). Fix a generating set S for SLn(Z[x])
consisting of all elementary matrices of the form Eij(1) and Eij(x). Note that using
the commutator relations all the elementary matrices Eij(x
r) for r ≥ 2 can also be
generated. Recall that u is unipotent when u− Id is nilpotent. It is well-knowns that
F is a field and w ∈ GLn(F ) is a nilpotent matrix, then wn = 0. Writing u = Id+w,
from wn = 0, we have for every k ≥ n:
uq = (Id + w)q =
n−1∑
k=0
(
q
k
)
wk.
In particular it follows that each entry of uq is a polynomial of degree at most n− 1
in the polynomial ring Q[x][q]. Let d be a common denominator of the fractions
appearing the entries of uq. At this point, we are going to use the following special
case of a theorem of Suslin proven in [12]:
Theorem 4.3 (Suslin). For n ≥ 3, and m ≥ 1 the group SLn(Z[x1, . . . , xm]) is
generated by elementary matrices.
We can now view the matrix udq for q ≥ 1 as an element of the group SLn(Z[q, x]).
Using Suslin’s Theorem, udq can be expressed as a product of elementary matrices
Id + Eij(t), with t ∈ Z[x, q]. Write t =
∑d
l=0 alq
l, with al ∈ Z[x]. Choose an index k
different from i, j and note that
Eij(t) =
d∏
l=0
Eij(alq
l) =
d∏
l=0
[Eik(al), Ekj(q
l)].
This implies that
ℓS(Eij(t)) ≤ 2
d∑
l=0
ℓS(Eik(al)) + ℓS(Ekj(q
l)) ≤ C log q +O(1).
Since uq is a product of a bounded (independent of q) of elementary matrices of the
above form, it has a length bounded by O(log q). It follows that u is a U-element. 
Many other examples can be built out of this example using the following lemma:
Lemma 4.4. Let G be a group generated by a set S. Suppose g ∈ G is such that the
cyclic subgroup generated by g is exponentially distorted in G. Let φ : G → H be a
group homomorphism. If φ(g) has infinite order, then it is exponentially distorted in
H.
Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume that φ is surjective. Let S be a finite
generating set for G and S = φ(S) be the image of G under φ. One can readily see
that S is a generating set for H = φ(G), and that for every g ∈ G, we have
ℓH(φ(g)) ≤ ℓG(g).
From here it follows immediately that if g is a U-element, then so is φ(g). 
Example 4.1. Using Theorem 4.1 and Lemma 4.4 one can construct a large number
of other matrix groups with U-elements. Let I be an ideal of Z[x]. For instance, we
can choose a polynomial f(x) ∈ Z[x], and let I be the ideal generated by f(x). Set
R = Z[x]/I. It is easy to see from Theorem 4.1 and Lemma 4.4 that the image of
every unipotent matrix in SLn(Z[x]/I) is a U-element.
Let us consider a special case of interest here. Let Ik be the ideal generated by
f(x) = xk+1 where k ≥ 1. Consider the group Gn,k = SLn(Z[x]/(xk+1)). One can
easily check that Gn,k is a finitely generated group, with a generating set consisting
of all elementary matrices of the form Eij(x
r) with 0 ≤ r ≤ k. Let πk denote the
reduction map fromR/Ik to Z defined by f(x) 7→ f(0). It is easily seen that πk induces
a surjection from SLn(Z[x]/Ik) to SLn(Z), yielding the following exact sequence:
0 7→ Nn,k → SLn(Z[x]/Ik)→ SLn(Z)→ 0
where Nn,k denotes the kernel of the reduction map.
Proposition 4.5. The kernel Nn,k is a nilpotent group of class k.
Proof. It is easy to see that Nn,k consists of those matrices A ∈ Gn,k such that every
entry of A − Id is divisible by x. Suppose A,B ∈ Nn,k. Then A = Id + xA′ and
B = Id + xB′, where A′, B′ are matrices with integer coefficients. Note that
AB = Id + x(A′ +B′) + xA′B′, BA = Id + x(A′ +B′) + xB′A′.
In particular, we have AB ≡ BA (mod I2), which shows that [A,B] ≡ Id (mod I2).
By a similar argument one can show that if A ≡ Id (mod Ip) and B ≡ Id (mod Iq),
then [A,B] (mod Id) (mod Ip+q). The claim follows from here. 
5. KPA security
In this section we will turn to the question of security of the scheme. It is well
known that the main security property of a symmetric-key encryption scheme is KPA
security. This poses the question of whether the adversary will be able to recover
the secret generating set if she accumulates several elements of a known geodesic
length with respect to an unknown generating set. In this direction we will prove the
following
Proposition 5.1. Let Γ be an infinite finitely generated subgroup of GLn(C). Given
g1, . . . , gm ∈ Γ, and positive integers k1, . . . , km, suppose that there exists a generating
set S for Γ such that ℓΓ,S(gi) = ki for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Then there are infinitely many
generating sets Sj, j = 1, 2, . . . such that
(1)
ℓΓ,Sj (gi) = ki
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and j ≥ 1.
(2) The associated metrics ℓΓ,Sj on Γ are pairwise distinct.
Proof. Since Γ is fixed, in interest of conciseness we will drop it from the subscript.
Let S = {s1, . . . , sr}. First we will construct an infinite number of generating sets
Sj that fulfill condition (1). In fact, the constructed family will be of the form
Sj = S ∪ {tj} for some tk ∈ Γ with this property. Let F (x1, . . . , xr, y) denote the
group generated freely by the variables x1, . . . , xr, y. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and each
word w ∈ F (x1, . . . , xr, y) with word length (with respect to x1, . . . , xr, y) less than
ki, consider the set
A(i, w) = {h ∈ G : w(s1, . . . , sr, h) = gi}.
Clearly the set
Ai =
⋃
ℓ(w)<ni
A(i, w)
consists of those h ∈ H with the property that the length of gi with respect to the
extended generating set S ′ = S ∪ {h} is less than ni. Finally, set A =
⋃
1≤i≤mAi. It
suffices to show that G − A is infinite. To see this, denote by G the Zariski closure
of Γ in GLn(C), and consider the equality
w(s1, . . . , sr, h) = gi
as an equation in entries hij of the matrix h. It is clear that this is a set of polynomial
equations. This means that the set of solutions is a Zariski closed subset of GLn(C).
Note also that since the length of gi is ni > ℓ(w), substituting the identity matrix
for h does not yield an equality. In other words, each one of these Zariski closed
sets is proper. Now, if Γ − A is finite, then by adding finitely many points G, and
hence it Zariski closure is a union of finitely many proper Zariski-closed sets. This is a
contradiction unless Γ is finite. This shows that there are infinitely many Sj = S∪{tj}
that satisfy (1).
We will now proceed as follows: start with the generating set S as above and let
S1 = S ∪ {t1} be a new generating set satisfying (1). Note that ℓS1(t1) = 1, while
ℓS(t1) > 1, hence ℓS and ℓS1 are different metrics.
Now, applying what has already been proved to the set {g1, . . . , gm, t1} we can find
a new generating sense S2 = S1 ∪ {t2} with |S2| = |S1|+ 1 such that
ℓS2(gi) = ki
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and j ≥ 1 and ℓS2(t1) = 1. Note that ℓS2(t2) = 1, while since
t2 6∈ S1 we have ℓS(t2) > 1 and ℓS1(t2) > 1. In particular, the metric ℓS2 is different
from both ℓS and ℓS1 . The argument can now be continued by induction in the same
fashion such that Sj = S ∪ {t1, . . . , tj}. Now, using the argument above, we find
tj+1 6∈ Sj such that if Sj+1 = Sj ∪ {tj+1} then ℓSj+1(g1) = k1, . . . , ℓSj+1(gm) = km.
Now, since ℓSj+1(tj+1) = 1, while ℓSq(tj+1) > 1, we deduce that ℓSj+1 is distinct from
all the previously constructed metrics.

6. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that one can that group theoretic phenomenon of
distortion in arithmetic groups can be used to build a new symmetric-key crypto-
graphic scheme. Arithmetic groups, on the one hand, have the advantage that their
elements can be communicated rather easily. On the other hand, the inherent com-
plexity of these groups and their rich subgroup structure has the potential to turn
them into fertile ground for cryptographic purposes. Let us conclude the article with
two remarks.
First note that using the arithmetic group SLn(Z) has several advantages over hy-
perbolic groups, one of which is that elements in SLn(Z) can be easily communicated
without revealing how they are expressed in terms of generators of the group. This
can, of course, also be done for those hyperbolic groups which are linear, but there
does not seem to be an obvious way of replicating this for general hyperbolic groups.
Solving the geodesic problem seems to be difficult for arithmetic groups. However, a
modification of the above protocol can be made to work if one can solve the modified
geodesic problem. Given an arbitrary element g ∈ SL3(Z), the modified geodesic
problem find generators g1, . . . , gm ∈ E such that g =
∏
1≤i≤m g
±1
i and m < CℓG(g)
for a uniform constant C.
The question has been studied in [11] for the case G = SLn(Z), where such a result
is established with constant c(n) = O(nn) which is impractical for real applications.
Since the lower bound proven in [11] is independent of n, one may inquire if the
constant can be improved or even made independent of n.
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